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FIFTH AMENDMENT MORALS
WILLIAM J. KENEALY, S.J.*
T HE HONORABLE EARL WARREN, Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, was scheduled to deliver an address on the Bill
of Rights. Shortly before his address a group of state employees, charged
with the responsibility of determining what announcements could be
posted upon the state employees' bulletin board, refused to permit
the Bill of Rights to be posted because it was a "controversial" document.
A bitter altercation arose; but, after the Governor of the state vouched
in writing for its non-controversial character, the Bill of Rights was per-
mitted to occupy a place along with routine items of interest. The Chief
Justice in his address, commenting upon the incident, stated:
And this happened in the United States of America on the 15th day of
December, 1954, the 163rd anniversary of our Bill of Rights, declared by
proclamation of President Eisenhower to be Bill of Rights Day. It is straws
in the wind like this which cause some thoughtful people to ask the ques-
tion whether ratification of the Bill of Rights could be obtained today if
we were faced squarely with the issue.'
The state employees' dispute, of course, centered around the consti-
tutional privilege against self-incrimination. For several years the highly
publicized activities of congressional investigating committees have
focused public attention and debate upon this clause in the fifth amend-
ment to our Federal Constitution. Nevertheless, many of our people
still do not appreciate the meaning and the merit of this vital protection
of our civil liberties.
The American Institute of Public Opinion published a recent survey2
which reported in part as follows:
Each person in today's survey was first asked: 'When you hear or read
about the fifth amendment, what does it mean to you?' Here is the way
their replies added up: Correct ... 42%; Incorrect, vague ... 11%; Can't
say ... 47%.
*A.B. (1928), A.M. (1929), Boston College; Ph.D., Gregorian University (1932);
S.T.L., Weston College (1935); LL.B. Georgetown University (1939); Professor
of Law, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans, La.; former Dean, Boston
College Law School.
1 New York Times, Dec. 16, 1954.
2 New Orleans States, May 3, 1957.
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All those who could say what the fifth
amendment was [sic] were then asked:
'When you hear of a person using the fifth
amendment, do you generally think he is
guilty, or not?' The vote of informed adults:
Yes, think he is... 71%; No, do not...
20%; Can't say... 9%.
This survey, as quoted in the cited publi-
cation, did not contain the key used in eval-
uating the answers
to the first ques-
tion; and the sec-
ond question is
somewhat ambig-
uous. Neverthe-
less, the report as
a whole confirms
this writer's con-
viction that an ap-
palling number of
Americans, edu-
WILLIAM J. KENEALY, S.J. cated as well as
uneducated, fail to appreciate the value of
a great constitutional safeguard of their own
liberties; and they fail to appreciate its value
because they do not understand its mean-
ing. Its meaning is rooted in its history; and
the history of the privilege against self-
incrimination is a long and bloody battle for
personal dignity and liberty against collec-
tive might and governmental tyranny.
In 1535 a great champion died in that
battle. Thomas More, saint and martyr,
lawyer and judge, humanist and humorist,
the first layman to be Lord Chancellor of
England, and one of the truly commanding
figures of world history, was beheaded in
the courtyard outside the Tower of London.
He had been summoned before the King's
Commission which was investigating dis-
loyal and subversive activity against the
reigning Henry VIII. During the investiga-
tion, Thomas More resolutely refused to
answer many questions propounded to him.
He did so on the ground that the investi-
gators had made no specific accusation
against him, and argued that no man could
be compelled to accuse himself or to furnish
evidence upon which an accusation against
him could be made by others: He appealed
to an old maxim of the Canon Law, nemo
tenetur se ipsum prodere, which had be-
come part of the jurisprudence of the
common law of England, but which was
honored at the time more in theory than in
practice. He was taunted with cowardice
because he would not "speak even plain
out." But his learning routed his inquisitors
as his courage defied their tyranny.
The King's Commission failed to force
Thomas More to accuse himself, or to give
testimony upon which they themselves
could frame an accusation against him.
Frustrated in the investigatory process, the
Commission, nevertheless, sent him to the
Tower of London. Subsequently, a formal
accusation of treason was concocted and
filed against him, based upon false allega-
tions of subversive utterances imputed to
him while imprisoned in the Tower. Finally,
at the ensuing trial, he was convicted and
sentenced to death upon the perjured testi-
mony of others, especially of one Richard
Rich, the Solicitor General, for whose per-
jury he was "sorrier than for his own peril."
It is important to note, however, that at
the trial Thomas More took the stand, ar-
gued his own case, answered all questions,
and replied to every specific allegation made
against him.3 He did not claim the right to
be silent in a judicial proceeding when for-
mally charged with specific accusations of
crime. That right was a later development
in the Canon Law of the Church and the
common law of England. In 1535 the scope
3 See CHAMBERS, THOMAS MORE 335-39 (1936).
of the principle, nemo tenetur se ipsum pro-
dere, did not extend so far. Yet it did, when
honored in practice, protect a man from
being forced to accuse himself or to give
testimony from which an accusation could
be framed against him by others. After the
martyrdom of Thomas More, and many
others who followed his example, a century
and a half of tyranny and torture was to
afflict the liberties of Englishmen before the
modern privilege against self-incrimination
developed and became firmly fixed in our
law.
A century after the severed head of
Thomas More was impaled for public view
on London Bridge, one John Lilburne was
summoned before the Star Chamber on a
charge of having imported certain seditious
and heretical books. Unlike More before
the King's Commission, Lilburne before
the Star Chamber was confronted with a
specific accusation. Nevertheless, in 1637,
he refused to answer or to testify on the
grounds of self-incrimination. He was sen-
tenced to be whipped and pilloried precisely
because of his refusal to testify, and the sen-
tence was executed. But the cause of civil
liberties had progressed since the martyr-
dom of More. Lilburne carried his fight to
Parliament. The House of Commons voted
that his sentence was illegal and against the
liberty of the subject; the House of Lords
voted him an indemnity of three thousand
pounds. But even after the victory of the
tenacious John Lilburne, a half-century was
to pass before the modern privilege against
self-incrimination became securely estab-
lished and generally available in our law.
It may be that the firm establishment and
general availability of the privilege was not
accomplished until approximately the year
1700. In any event, it is not without signi-
ficance that the gradual establishment of the
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privilege against self-incrimination coin-
cided with the gradual abandonment of the
practice of extorting confession by physical
torture. They are different but closely re-
lated. The establishment of the one and the
abandonment of the other are twin triumphs
in the inspiring struggle for personal dig-
nity against collective might. The American
colonists, no strangers to the struggle, em-
bodied the privilege in their own common
law and expressly incorporated it, with ver-
bal variations, into the constitutions of sev-
eral of the original states. It was written into
the fifth amendment, adopted in 1791, as
follows: "No person... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."'4 So much for the historical roots.
What is the scope of this modern constitu-
tional privilege?
It may be of interest to note, initially,
that the scope of the modern constitutional
privilege is much narrower than the scope
of the corresponding privilege in Canon
Law. The ancient canonical privilege, nemo
tenetur se ipsum prodere, has been widely
extended and implemented in modern Canon
Law. In Canon Law not only is no one
obliged to accuse himself, or to give testi-
mony from which others could frame an
accusation against him, or even to answer
when formally charged with a specific judi-
cial accusation; but no one, defendant or
witness, can be obliged to testify if he fears
that his testimony will incriminate him, or
cause infamy, dangerous vexations, or other
grave hardships - either to himself or his
relatives, by consanguinity or affinity, in
any degree of the direct line and to the first
degree of the collateral line. 5
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 CODEX IURIS CANONICI, Can. 1743, §§1-2; Can.
1755, § 2 n.2.
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This reference to Canon Law is not
made, of course, to argue or insinuate that
the constitutional privilege should be as
broad as the canonical. For Church and
state are two different societies, with differ-
ent purposes, different powers, and different
problems. The state must meet its own prob-
lem of subversive and un-American activi-
ties; but the Church too must meet its
own problem of subversive and un-Catholic
activities. Nevertheless, the tremendously
wide scope of the canonical privilege against
self-incrimination illustrates and activates
the Church's profound deference, in the ful-
fillment of its eternal purpose and in the
exercise of its divine power, to the dignity
and inviolability of the individual person -
not merely the good and respected, but the
bad and despised, and the indifferent and
unknown person - that is, the dignity and
inviolability of human personality itself.
But the state pursues its temporal purpose
and exercises its civil power for the benefit
of the same persons. Wherefore, within the
reasonable limits of its practical problems
and within the reasonable demands of its
public obligations, a similar deference to
personal dignity and inviolability should be
exercised by the state. Hence, we return to
the question: what is the scope of our mod-
ern constitutional privilege?
First: the fifth amendment privilege is a
purely personal one. It does not protect
relatives or friends or neighbors or corpora-
tions or labor unions, but only the accused
or the witness from compulsory testimony.
Since the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is a purely personal one, it cannot be
utilized by or on behalf of any organization,
such as a corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 .... Moreover, the papers and ef-
fects which the privilege protects must be
the private property of the person claiming
the privilege, or at least in his possession in
a purely personal capacity. Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616. But individuals, when
acting as representatives of a collective
group, cannot be said to be exercising their
personal rights and duties nor to be entitled
to their purely personal privileges. Rather
they assume the rights, duties and privileges
of the artificial entity or association of which
they are agents or officers and they are
bound by its obligations. In their official
capacity, therefore, they have no privilege
against self-incrimination. And the official
records and documents of the organization
that are held by them in a representative
rather than in a personal capacity cannot be
the subject of the personal privilege against
self-incrimination, even though production
of the papers might tend to incriminate them
personally. 6
Second: this personal privilege protects
against incrimination only. It regards future
penal consequences exclusively, that is,
either punishments for crimes, or penalties
or forfeitures affixed by law to criminal acts.
It cannot be invoked as a protection against
public infamy, dangerous vexations, or other
grave hardships which are not legal punish-
ments for crimes, or legal penalties or for-
feitures affixed by law to criminal acts.
Hence, if a witness has already been par-
doned, or if he has already been punished,
or if he is presently protected against future
punishment by the terms of an immunity
statute, he cannot invoke the privilege and
he must testify regardless of the conse-
quences to himself.7 In Counselman v. Hitch-
cock,8 an immunity statute which merely
6 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699
(1944).
7 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956);
Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
forbade the direct use of compelled testi-
mony in a future criminal prosecution, while
failing to prohibit the indirect use of the
same in uncovering further information to
be used as evidence in a future criminal
prosecution, was held to be insufficient to
remove the constitutional privilege. In Ull-
mann v. United States,9 the Immunity Act
of 195410 which prohibits both direct and
indirect use of compelled testimony in
future criminal prosecutions, was held com-
mensurate with the protection of the priv-
ilege, and therefore sufficient to remove the
privilege. In this latter case the Supreme
Court, despite a vigorous dissenting opin-
ion, decided that the Immunity Act need
not protect the unwilling witness against
public opprobrium, social ostracism, loss of
a job, expulsion from a labor union, in-
eligibility for federal employment or for
work in defense plants; disqualification for
a passport, the risk of internment, or any
other disabilities or consequences which are
neither punishments for crimes nor penal-
ties or forfeitures affixed by law to criminal
acts. The witness forced to testify by the
Immunity Act will always have the right, of
course, to claim that any given sanction,
which may be threatened, is criminal in na-
ture. It appears that a witness, compelled to
testify under the Immunity Act, may in fact
suffer non-criminal disabilities and hard-
ships which he would not suffer if he were
free to invoke the constitutional privilege.
Third: Despite the in any criminal case
phrase of the amendment, or rather because
of it, the privilege may be invoked in any
compulsory proceeding. The privilege is
obviously available to a defendant in a
criminal case; but it is also available, by
9 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
10 18 U.S.C. §3486 (Supp. 1I, 1954).
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consistent federal court determinations, 1 to
any witness in a criminal case or in a civil
case, before a grand jury or before a legis-
lative committee, or in any proceeding in
which compelled testimony might lead to
future penal consequences for the witness.
The efficacy of the privilege demands its
availability at the first approach of compul-
sion. Otherwise, the purpose of the privilege
could be evaded and nullified by the use,
direct or indirect, of previously compelled
testimony as the basis of a future criminal
charge and the evidence for a future convic-
tion; whereby the witness, directly or in-
directly, but ultimately and effectively, could
in fact be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.'2
Fourth: The purpose of the constitutional
privilege is not precisely to protect either
the actually innocent or the actually guilty,
but it is rather to protect the actually or
potentially accused. The defendant or the
witness may in fact be innocent or guilty of
the actual or potential accusation; but in
contemplation of law he is presumed inno-
cent until proved guilty, and by rule of law
he is privileged to abstain from proving his
innocence or his guilt. Surely, this is a civ-
ilized presumption and a reasonable rule
consonant with human dignity and liberty.
Fifth.: Moreover, the invocation of the
11Watkins v. United States, 77 S. Ct. 1173 (1957);
Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955); Em-
spak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn
v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
12 But see McManus, The Natural Law and the
Fifth Amendment, 3 CATHOLIC LAWYER 6, 7-8
(Jan. 1957). I do not share Professor McManus'
regret that the privilege has been judicially inter-
preted to cover testimony at congressional investi-
gations. In this respect, at least, I have no urge
to "fight City Hall" and I am content that the
Court has "taken us beyond the point of no re-
turn."
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constitutional privilege is quite consistent
with innocence of crime. In 1807, Chief
Justice Marshall stated that a deliberately
false claim of the privilege was perjury: "If
the declaration be untrue, it is in conscience
and in law as much a perjury as if he had
declared any other untruth upon his oath."1 3
Is it logically necessary to conclude, there-
fore, that one invoking the privilege is either
guilty of perjury or of the crime under pros-
ecution or investigation? In 1915, Justice
McKenna answered: "not necessarily in
fact, not at all in theory of law."'14 As- late
as 1956, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the Court in the Ullmann case, protested:
Too many, even those who should be bet-
ter advised, view this privilege as a shelter
for wrongdoers. They too readily assume
that those who invoke it are either guilty of
crime or commit perjury in claiming the
privilege. Such a view does scant honor to
the patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights
as a condition to acceptance of the Consti-
tution by the ratifying States. The Founders
of the Nation were not naive or disregardful
of the interests of justice. 15
A few weeks later, Justice Clark, also speak-
ing for the Court and obviously attempting
to dissipate this false interpretation of the
privilege, similarly protested:
At the outset we must condemn the prac-
tice of imputing a sinister meaning to the
exercise of a person's constitutional right
under the Fifth Amendment. . . . In Ull-
mann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, de-
cided last month, we scored the assumption
that those who claim this privilege are
either criminals or perjurors. The privilege
against self-incrimination would be reduced
13 United States v. Burr, In re Willie, 25 Fed. Cas.
No. 14692e, at 40 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
14 Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
15 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-27
(1956).
to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be
taken as equivalent either. to a confession of
guilt or a conclusive presumption of per-
jury. As we pointed out in Ullmann, a wit-
ness may have reasonable fear of prosecution
and yet be innocent of any wrongdoing.
The privilege serves to protect the innocent
who otherwise might be ensnared by am-
biguous circumstances.1 6
Experienced lawyers are well aware that
some innocent clients may be well justified
and well advised to invoke the privilege,
because of various factors and circum-
stances, not only in criminal trials but also
in investigative proceedings. The man who
has killed another by accident or in justifi-
able self-defense has committed no crime at
all; but his admission of the unwitnessed or
unproved act of killing will clearly incrimi-
nate him by establishing one element of a
serious crime, furnishing some evidence of
guilt, rendering the burden of the prosecu-
tion lighter, making the task of the defense
heavier, and possibly endangering his lib-
erty or his own life. He may be a headstrong
fool not to invoke the privilege; but if he
does invoke it, even unwisely, it would be
unwarranted and rash to raise the hue and
cry of "fifth amendment murderer!"
Many crimes consist of multiple ele-
ments, both physical and mental - overt
acts performed with specific intentions or in
special circumstances. Overt acts may be
quite innocent or indifferent in themselves,
being criminal only by reason of the specific
intent of the actor or the special circum-
stances of the action. But an overt act, how-
ever innocent, may well be one element of
an alleged crime. Its proof may well be
some evidence of alleged guilt. Passing a
check, purchasing a poison, publishing an
16 Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557
(1956).
untruth, shooting a rifle, threatening a man,
striking him, driving his car, signing his
name, selling his property, picking his
peaches, branding his cow, firing his barn,
breaking his window, entering his home,
taking his baby, killing his wife, or even
joining the Communist Party: - these are
all overt acts which may be, as at times they
have been, either guilty acts or innocent
acts. They may be, therefore, incriminating
facts. But furthermore, in addition to overt
acts which are constituent elements of
alleged crimes, there are almost infinitely
possible fact situations which, while not in-
trinsic elements of any crime, nevertheless
can provide circumstantial evidence of al-
leged crimes, and which can form a link in
the chain of evidence pointing towards non-
existent but alleged guilt. In the light of
these considerations there seems to be no
rational or logical basis for the popular per-
jury or crime dilemma. Rather it seems to
be based upon the emotional drive to find
scapegoats for our social evils. Possibly this
explains why it is in such high favor with
the demagogue. In any event, it is certain
that the constitutional privilege extends, not
merely to answers which would in them-
selves support a conviction, but also to all
answers which would form a link in the
chain of circumstantial evidence needed to
prosecute the witness for crime."
Sixth: In order to take advantage of the
protection of the privilege, the witness must
claim it. The claim may be made in any
understandable language and does not de-
mand any particular words, ritualistic for-
mula or talismanic phrase."8 But the claim
must be restricted to instances where the
17 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
18 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955);
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
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witness has reasonable cause to apprehend
danger from an answer.1 9 The witness has
no unlimited or arbitrary right to claim the
privilege. In the last resort it is the court
which must decide whether, under all the
circumstances, the witness' claim and re-
fusal to answer were reasonable or not. The
witness at a legislative investigation, there-
fore, must invoke his claim and refuse to
answer at the peril of a subsequent court
decision.
The witness is not exonerated from an-
swering merely because he declares that in
so doing he would incriminate himself - his
say-so does not of itself establish the hazard
of incrimination. It is for the court to say
whether his silence is justified, Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), and to
require him to answer if it clearly appears
to the court that he is mistaken. Temple v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892 (1881). How-
ever, if the witness, upon interposing his
claim, were required to prove the hazard in
the sense in which a claim is usually re-
quired to be established in court, he would
be compelled to surrender the very protec-
tion which the privilege is designed to guar-
antee. To sustain the privilege, it need only
be evident from the implications of the
question, in the setting in which it is asked,
that a responsive answer to the question or
an explanation of why it cannot be answered
might be dangerous because injurious dis-
closure could result. 20
Seventh: Probably the greatest confusion
in the public mind, concerning the meaning
and scope of the privilege, is caused by the
doctrine of "waiver." The privilege gives no
one the option of picking and choosing at
will among the questions he decides to an-
swer and those he decides not to answer -
even among questions which are clearly in-
19 Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917).
20 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S::479, 486
(1951).
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criminating. In a criminal trial the defendant
may invoke the privilege and decline to take
the stand; but if he testifies at all, he
"waives" the privilege and must answer all
questions relevant to the issue of the trial.
The judge is there to see that he does, and
to see that all questions are relevant to the
issue.
Unlike criminal trials, however, investi-
gations have no sharply defined issues as
measures of relevancy. In the nature of the
investigatory process they cannot. Where-
fore problems. A witness who answers one
question may be held to have waived the
privilege as to all "related questions"; one
who has given some testimony may be held
to have waived the privilege in the same
"area of investigation." For instance, a wit-
ness who willingly testified that she had
been the treasurer of a local communist cell
and had transferred the party's records to
another person, was held to have waived
her privilege and was adjudged in contempt
for refusing to name that other person.
"Disclosure of a fact waives the privilege as
to details.... "21 A dissent in Rogers v.
United States22 pointed up a difficulty with
the decision by arguing that ". . . today's
holding creates this dilemma for witnesses:
on the one hand, they risk imprisonment
for contempt by asserting the privilege pre-
maturely; on the other, they might lose the
privilege if they answer a single question.
The Court's view makes the protection de-
pend on timing so refined that lawyers, let
alone laymen, will have difficulty knowing
when to claim it. '23
This was undoubtedly the reason why
21 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373
(1951).
22 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
23 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 378
(1951)' (dissenting opinion).
Mr. Dave Beck, Sr., recently invoked the
privilege when he was asked by the McClel-
lan Committee whether or not he knew Mr.
Dave Beck, Jr. The absence of a sharply-
defined issue and the delicacy of the waiver
doctrine are undoubtedly the reasons why
many witnesses at congressional investiga-
tions have surprised, bewildered, annoyed
and even angered the television audience by
their monotonous refusals to answer some
apparently simple and innocuous questions.
The skillful investigator knows what he is
after; he is keenly aware that the privilege
may block his way, and that a waiver will
clear his path; and he frames his questions
accordingly. The witness, anxious to retain
his privilege, and fearful that the interroga-
tor may trap him into a waiver, shadow-
boxes and dances around defensively to the
disgust of the ringsiders who came to see a
slugging match with the hope that some-
body would get decked, but good!
About five years ago a prominent play-
wright, who had been summoned by a con-
gressional investigating committee, wrote to
the chairman as follows:
. .. I am ready and willing to testify before
the representatives of our government as to
my own opinions and my own actions, re-
gardless of any risks or consequences to
myself. But I am advised by counsel that if
I answer the committee's questions about
myself, I must also answer questions about
other people, and that if I refuse to do so,
I can be cited for contempt . . . I am not
willing, now or in the future, to bring bad
trouble to people who, in my past associa-
tion with them, were completely innocent
of any talk or action that was disloyal or
subversive . . . I am prepared to waive the
privilege against self-incrimination and tell
you anything you wish to know about my
views or actions, if your committee will
agree to refrain from asking me to name
other people. If the committee is unwilling
to give me this assurance, I will be forced
to plead the privilege of the Fifth Amend-
ment at the hearing.
24
The committee chairman refused the offer
on the ground that the committee could not
permit a witness to determine the conditions
or define the limits of her testimony, or be
placed in the position of trading with a wit-
ness. The witness appeared, invoked the
privilege, and declined to testify about her-
self or others. Assuming that her own
activities would not have been personally
incriminating, she had no privilege to in-
voke and no right, of course, to set up a
false claim of privilege in order to protect
her friends. For the privilege is purely per-
sonal. However, assuming that her own
activities would have been personally in-
criminating, in the sense explained above,
she had a right to invoke the privilege, even
though her ulterior motive was to protect
others. For motive and intent are not the
same thing: the first regards the why, the
second the what. The fact that the witness
was emotionally indifferent to her own fate,
and was motivated by a desire to protect
others, did not destroy her right intention-
ally to invoke her own protection. The chair-
man of the committee, on the other hand,
was quite within his authority in refusing to
agree to a deal which amounted to trading
with a witness. Yet the committee and the
country lost whatever benefit, if any, knowl-
edge of the witness' own personal activities
would confer.
The above is a brief and, I fear, weari-
some epitome of this writer's concept of the
historical origin, the meaning and scope,
and some of the many difficult legal prob-
lems of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. But there are
philosophical and moral problems involved
24 New York Times, May 22, 1952, p. 15, col. 1.
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too. One illustration may be of some inter-
est. Usually such problems are fictitious or
at least fictionalized. The following, how-
ever, is frankly a real case with which the
writer is personally and closely acquainted. 25
It is also typical of very many similar moral
problems.
A Moral Problem
Some years ago an idealistic young man,
motivated by a desire to work for social jus-
tice for the negro, joined the Communist
Party. He lived in a "segregated" part of the
country and was a daily witness of the tragic
injustice visited by respectable folk upon
their colored neighbors. Mistakenly, al-
though alas! understandably, he thought
that the Communist Party was the only
organization of consequence interested in
laboring for the equal rights and civil liber-
ties of the negro people. While in the Party
he recruited a few of his friends who were
motivated by the same ideals. During the
period of their membership neither he nor
his friends had any part or knowledge what-
soever of the subversive activities of the
organization. They were assigned to work
for and with the negro. Nevertheless, a few
years after joining they all quit the Party in
disillusionment and disgust, convinced by
bitter experience that the Party simply had
no bona fide interest in the negro at all, but
was solely interested in a cynical, albeit
futile, 20 attempt to use him as a political
25 It is understood, I trust, that I did not come by
my knowledge as a clergyman. Moreover, the wit-
ness involved has personally read the following
account of his problem and has gladly consented
to its publication.
26 A record of the Communist Party's futile at-
tempt to recruit substantial numbers of negroes,
by promising alleviation of their tragic civil disa-
bilities, would constitute an inspiring tribute to
the genuine Americanism of the negro people
- an embarassing tribute, in fact, against the
ironical background of the current pandemonium
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pawn. In the meantime the young man
completed his university and professional
education. He frankly revealed his former
communist membership and activities to the
licensing authorities of his profession and
to his employers. A few months ago he was
requested to appear before an advance
agent of an investigating committee. He
spoke with the agent willingly and freely of
his activities and experiences in the Party,
of the Party's pr.)cedures and techniques,
and of all he knew about it - except that he
did not name his friends indicated above.
Shortly thereafter he was summoned by the
committee to testify at a televised hearing
of the committee itself. Wbence the prob-
lem: what should he do? What would a law-
yer advise? Or a moralist?
He has three possible courses: 1) He can
invoke the privilege and thus protect his
friends.27 This is what the playwright-wit-
ness did. But if he does this, he and his
family will certainly suffer public oppro-
brium and social ostracism; he will surely
lose his job and probably the practice of his
profession.2 8 As a matter of fact the situa-
tion is so critical that an extremely close
relative has just been categorically notified
of automatic loss of position if he (the wit-
ness) "takes" the fifth amendment! 2) He
can waive the privilege and expose his
friends. But if he does this, his friends will
unquestionably suffer similar,. possibly
over civil rights legislation. Such a record would
have its amusing aspects too. Frequently in the
rural South the only places the negroes could be
assembled was in the negro churches; but, to the
exasperation of their communist would-be organ-
izers, the negroes would yawn and drowse through
dialectical materialism and then wake up and
wind up the meetings vivaciously singing spirituals.
27 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
28 See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442
(1954).
worse, retaliations. For their former com-
munist membership and activities are quite
unknown to the general public and to their
own social, business and professional cir-
cles. Having "enticed" them into the Party,
he feels responsible for their present pre-
carious positions. They are all extremely
frightened; one is close to a nervous break-
down; one is even contemplating suicide in
the event of exposure. 3) He can waive the
privilege but still refuse to name his friends.
But if he does this, he and his family will
suffer at least some of the evils of the first
course, and he will probably or possibly go
to jail as well.2 9 He is troubled, of course,
29 This problem arose, and the above lines were
written, before Watkins v. United States, 77 S. Ct.
1173, which was decided June 17, 1957. It is
submitted, however, that even Watkins does not
dissipate the danger of a striped suit for our wit-
ness. It is true that Mr. Watkins testified freely
about himself and about others who were, to his
knowledge or belief, still members of the Party;
and that he refused to testify about others who, to
his knowledge or belief, had deserted the Party.
And Justice Clark, in his dissent, stated arguendo
that Watkins was in fact seeking "to protect his
former associates, not himself, from embarrass-
ment .... It is settled that one cannot invoke the
constitutional rights of another. Tileston v. Ull-"
mann, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943)." But Justice Clark
did not claim that the majority had reversed the
rule of Tileston, or that the majority had repudi-
ated the principle that the privilege is purely per-
sonal. The majority opinion is not without some
obscurity to me, at least, and I confess to some
relief in reading the opening sentence of Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion: "I deem it im-
portant to state what I understand to be the Court's
holding." The decision in Watkins certainly does
not allow a witness, who has waived the privilege,
to refuse to name others when the questions asked
are not aimed at exposure for exposure's sake, but
are clearly relevant to an area of inquiry properly
delegated by the Congress. But in Watkins the
clear relevancy and the proper delegation were
found lacking, wherefore the conviction was viti-
ated by the vice of vagueness repugnant to due
process. If I am wrong, the whole matter will be
cleared up next semester when my students brief
the case.
about-his own welfare and that of his fam-
ily; but his chief concern is for the friends
he has unwittingly led into grave danger,
and he is repelled by the idea of dragging
their skeletons from the closet into public
view. He is maturer now by age and educa-
tion, and wiser by sad trial and experience.
And he is completely convinced, as a mat-
ter of private but sound judgment, that his
friends are utterly innocent of any part or
knowledge of any subversive activities, and
that neither the disclosure of their names,
nor the testimony which might be subse-
quently demanded of them, would add one
iota to the sum total of the committee's
useJul30 information about the Communist
Party or its subversive activities. 31 Now
what should he do?
Suppose that no informal agreement,
such as the "bargain" unsuccessfully at-
tempted by the playwright-witness, can be
made with the committee. Suppose also that
the witness in question, reluctantly resigned
to the consequences to himself and his fam-
30 Again, the witness' conviction about "useful"
information was expressed to me, and incorporated
into the above text, before Watkins and before
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 77 S. Ct. 1203 (1957),
decided the same day. It is interesting, therefore,
to note the following language in Watkins: "Their
[committee members'] decisions, nevertheless, can
lead to ruthless exposure of private lives in order
to gather data that is neither desired by the Con-
gress nor useful to it." (Italics supplied.) And in
Sweezy: "Within the very broad area thus com-
mitted to the discretion of the Attorney General
[of New Hampshire] there may be many facts
which the legislature [of that State] might find
useful. There would also be a great deal of data
which that assembly would not want or need."
(Italics supplied.)
31 The foregoing account of our witness' problem
is accurate and is not overdrawn. A more detailed
picture would show the situation even more dis-
tressing, but might lead to the identification of
c,thers. What follows, however, is simply suppo-
sition. I do not feel at liberty to reveal the actual
denouement.
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ily, and sincerely willing to give the com-
mittee all the useful information he has
concerning the Communist Party, yet des-
perately anxious to save his friends the
calamity of public exposure, solves his dis-
tressing trilemma by choosing the third and
last course. Suppose finally that he appears,
testifies frankly, but refuses to name his
friends; he is cited for contempt, tried in
court, and sentenced to jail. In such a sup-
position, would his refusal, or his sentence,
be morally justifiable?
Undoubtedly he has been legally sen-
tenced for a violation of the existing civil
law. 32 The question now is: has he violated
the natural law, and has he been sentenced
accordingly? The writer does not find the
answer easy.
In approaching an answer, and for the
purposes of this article, two repugnant the-
ories may be disregarded: first, the posi-
tivistic theory that, regardless of abstract
justice, no civil laws bind in conscience;
and second, the equally ghastly theory that,
regardless of abstract justice, all civil laws
bind in conscience. A solution will be at-
tempted in the traditional scholastic philos-
ophy of natural law.
Scholastic philosophers unanimously
hold that all true laws, divine or human,
natural or positive, ecclesiastical or civil,
impose some obligation upon the conscience
of the subject. But all true laws are man-
dated by justice and are measured by rea-
son. Therefore an unreasonable law is an
unjust law; and an unjust law is, in reality,
no law at all, but a species of violence. But
mere violence can never touch the human
32 At least if the delegation of the subject of in-
quiry and the pertinency of the questions pro-
pounded to the witness, in asking for the names,
were clear enough to avoid the vice of vagueness
which saved Mr. Watkins.
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conscience. Therefore an unjust civil law,
which is a species of governmental violence,
cannot bind the conscience of a citizen any
more than banditry, which is a species of
private violence, can bind the conscience of
a wayfarer. But in view of the communist
conspiracy and its grave threat to the civi-
lized world, no one can seriously contend
that a civil law is unreasonable or unjust
which authorizes a congressional commit-
tee to investigate the Communist Party and
its activities for the purpose of recommend-
ing legislation to protect the security of the
country and the welfare of its citizens.
Therefore, such a law, with its necessary
penal sanctions for those who deliberately
refuse to answer relevant questions, is obvi-
ously reasonable and just. Hence, it im-
poses some obligation in conscience.
Moreover, it is in the nature of a law to be
a general rule for the common good. The
legislating authority may provide exceptions
in the enactment of a law, or may alter a
law by enacting them later, but such excep-
tions merely define or limit, they do not
destroy, the essential generality of the rule.
But a subject cannot trespass upon the gen-
erality of the rule by making exceptions at
any time, because he has no legislative au-
thority. Therefore our witness in the prob-
lem case cannot make an exception for
himself or his friends regardless of the con-
sequences.
There is, however, the principle of epei-
keia3 3 to be considered. The principle of
epeikeia is based upon the fundamental but
extremely delicate balance between the in-
dividual good and the common good. For
the purpose of law is the common good. But
33 Aristotle's Greek term, whence the Latin
aequitas and the English equity. The principle of
epeikeia, however, is not to be confused with our
own rules of equity which regard authoritative.
not private, decisions.
the common good, although it may require
individual hardships and at times may even
demand the supreme personal sacrifice, has
an essential teleological relationship to the
individual good. The principle of epeikeia,
weighing private welfare against public wel-
fare, means this: that a private person,
when faced with an extraordinary situation,
when recourse to an authoritative decision
is impossible, may reasonably conclude, de-
spite the literal wording of a law, that the
legislature did not foresee such unusual cir-
cumstances, and that the legislation was not
intended to apply in such a difficult case,
because its application would create the
type of private hardship which would mili-
tate, directly or indirectly, against the pub-
lic welfare, which is the purpose of the law
itself. In our problem case, however, there
seems to be no room for the doctrine of
epeikeia.
There is no reasonable doubt about the
foresight of Congress and the intent of its
legislation in authorizing committee investi-
gations of the Communist Party and com-
munist activities. Congress foresaw full well,
not only generically but probably with con-
siderable particularity, that such investiga-
tions would result in acute embarrassments
and great hardships for many people, and
even innocent people. If there were ever any
doubt about this, it has long ago been dis-
pelled by the repeated resolutions of Con-
gress to continue the investigations over the
past several years when, as a matter of pub-
lic knowledge, the resulting embarrassments
and hardships have occasioned even sui-
cides. The courts, which are the final and
authoritative arbiters of legislative inten-
tion, would dismiss a plea of hardship as
legally frivolous. And granting that our
problem witness is absolutely correct in his
conviction that the naming of his friends
would not add one iota to the sum total of
the committee's useful information about
the Communist Party or its subversive ac-
tivities, yet the public law cannot allow pri-
vate judgment, however sincere and sound,
to make that decision. There cannot be one
law for the saint, and another for the sinner;
or one law for the seer, and another for the
fool. The principle of epeikeia is no open
sesame to a haven beyond the burdens of
just civil law. Our problem witness cannot
invoke it.
Our witness, then, has deliberately vio-
lated a just civil law. He is legally guilty.
But is he morally guilty? Is legal guilt al-
ways and necessarily moral guilt? On this
question scholastic philosophers split into
two opposing schools of thought, some-
times for convenience called the Thomists34
and the Suarezians. It is impossible in this
short article to expound the differences
and the reasons which separate the two
schools.3 5 However, the Thomists hold that
all just civil laws impose a direct moral obli-
gation of obedience upon the conscience of
34 It should be noted that this use of the term
"Thomist" is a very narrow one, confined to intra-
mural use among scholastics, and denoting this
one narrow point of controversy. In the ordinary
and more general use of the term, most "Suare-
zians" are also "Thomists," that is, they follow
the general philosophy and method of Thomas
Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), a Domin-
ican, and Saint and Doctor of the Church, is un-
questionably the greatest philosopher-theologian
of history. Francis Suarez (1548-1617), a Jesuit,
is one of the great legal philosophers of history;
one of his books, incidentally, was burned in
London and banned in Paris (1614) because it
advocated limited powers of government. This
controversy, however, is not a Dominican-Jesuit
dispute; members of both Orders cross party lines
with utmost abandon.
35 An excellent book, devoted exclusively to this
particular controversy, is The Nature of Law, by
Thomas E. Davitt, S.J. (1951). Illustrating an
observation made in the last note, the Jesuit Father
Davitt prefers the Thomist to the Suarezian theory.
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the subject. The Suarezians, on the other
hand, hold that some just civil laws may.
impose only an indirect moral 'obligation,
i.e., an obligation in the alternative: either
to perform the act commanded (name the
names) or to accept the penalty (go to jail)
for refusing to do so. Both..schools, of
course, hold that all justcivil laws impose
some moral obligation upon the conscience
of the subject, and therefore of our witness.
This writer timorously suggests that the
Thomist must logically hold either 1) that
the law is unjust, which would surprise the
Court; or 2) that the law does not apply to
the witness, which would surprise the Con-
gress; or 3) that in deliberately violating the
law the witness has committed a moral
wrong however slight, which would surprise
the witness. If the Thomist decides that the'
witness is guilty of a moral wrong in delib-
erately violating an applicable just law, he
may logically conclude that the penalty in-
flicted was morally justified. It would seem,
therefore, that the Thomist would have ad-
vised our witness to confine himself to one
of the first two choices in his trilemma:
either claim your privilege and protect your
friends, or waive your privilege and expose
your friends. But the Thomist could not ad-
vise or sanction the third possible solution:
waive your privilege but refuse to name
your friends.
The Suarezian, on. the other hand, may
logically hold both 1) that the penalty in-
flicted was morally justified and the witness
is morally bound to fulfill it, because it was
inflicted for the deliberate violation of a just
civil law; and 2) that the witness, neverthe-
less, did not commit any moral wrong in
violating this applicable just law, because
this particular law imposed only an indirect
or alternative obligation on his conscience,
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i.e., either name the names or accept the
penaltyA6 The Suarezian, therefore, could
advise or sanction the choice taken by our
problem witness. But which theory is right,
or at least more probably right, the Thomist
or Suarezian?
This writer, lacking the courage and the
competence to be apodictical, softly sug-
gests the Suarezian. He does so because,
although there are metaphysical difficulties
involved in both theories, the Suarezian the-
ory fits better whatever he knows about the
jurisprudence of our own civil law.
A definition should fit the thing defined.
To avoid sheer conceptualism, we must
begin a posteriori with a merely nominal
definition indicating generically the class of
beings to be defined (v.g., those "beings
generally called men"; those "rules gener-
ally enforced by the courts"), but excluding
for subsequent scrutiny the few bizarre and
dubious members of the class (v.g., the few
36 The above is an oversimplified statement of the
Suarezian theory. Suarezians differ among them-
selves on the intimate nature of the obligation in-
volved. Among other explanations, some main-
tain a disjunctive (either or) obligation (some a
conditional (if not) obligation. To the extent
that the disjunctive (either or) theory implies a
legislative indifference, as to the act or the penalty,
it seems unrealistic. Insofar as the conditional (if
not) theory implies a legislative intent that the law
be obeyed, but imposes a merely "juridical" obli-
gation to the act and a conditional (if not) moral
obligation to the penalty, it seems preferable.
Nevertheless, whether the obligation to the act
be called "juridical" or something else, it is not
a direct moral obligation.
Incidentally, since income tax evasion is frequently
a red herring which distracts from the merits of
the Thomist-Suarezian controversy, I would like
to protest that my personal opinion is that income
tax laws are not purely penal. Income tax evasion,
at least in contemporary society, seems to me to be
a violation of contributive (sometimes called
legal) justice which casts an unfair burden upon
others and is properly classified as a crime in-
volving moral turpitude.
monsters; the few clearly unreasonable rules
enforced by the courts). Then, inspecting
the members who clearly belong to the
class, we arrive by a process of abstraction
to a metaphysical definition of all members
of the class (v.g., "rational animals"; "ordi-
nance of reason authoritatively promulgated
for the common good"). Finally, we apply
our definition to the few bizarre and dubi-
ous members of the class to see whether
they belong or not (v.g., monsters do; un-
just rules do not). A similar a posteriori
process should be applied to the controversy
between the Thomists and the Suarezians
as to the existence of purely penal law.
The Thomist theory, that all true civil
laws impose a direct moral obligation,
would seem either 1) to exclude from the
concept of civil law a vast number of rea-
sonable and necessary rules daily enforced
by the courts for the common good; or 2)
to place upon the conscience of the citizen
a burden which the sensus communis of
good men considers non-existent, and which
the jurisprudence of our civil law does not
require. The Suarezian theory, on the other
hand, that some true civil laws may impose
only an indirect moral obligation, excludes
from the concept of civil law only the palp-
ably unjust rule, and does not place upon
the conscience of the citizen such a burden.
The latter theory shuns the ivory tower for
the work-a-day world of the courts.
The Suarezian theory fits more realis-
tically the accepted jurisprudence of our
civil law. Many fundamental distinctions,
deeply imbedded in our law so indicate: the
distinctions, for instance, between crimes
mala in se and mala prohibita; between
crimes which require a mens rea and those
which do not; between crimes involving
moral turpitude and those which do not;
between crimes for which bona fides is a
defense and those for which it is not; be-
tween ordinary criminal offenses and the
so-called public welfare offenses.37 This is
not to argue, by any means, that the Sua-
rezian distinction between "penal" and
"purely penal" offenses coincides neatly
and exactly with the distinctions instanced
above. It does not.. It does, however, share
with them the spirit and genius of our law.
It fits.
For example: what about an immigration
statute which provides for the deportation
of aliens upon conviction of crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude, but not upon convic-
tion of other punishable crimes? Such a
statute, and there are many such, seems to
postulate the Suarezian distinction in both
theory and practice. Moreover, what about
the multitudinous "public welfare offenses"
in which bona fides is no defense because a
mens rea is simply not an element of the
crime? This very important segment of our
criminal laws seems quite amenable to the
Suarezian theory. Finally, it has been ex-
plicitly held by the United States Supreme
Court that the deliberate refusal to answer
pertinent questions asked by a duly autho-
rized congressional committee does not in-
volve moral guilt, but the refusing witness
may be punished nevertheless. Justice Pierce
Butler, writing for the Court, put it this
way:
The gist of the offense is refusal to answer
pertinent questions. No moral turpitude is
involved. Intentional violation is sufficient
to constitute guilt. There was no misappre-
hension as to what was called for. The re-
37 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952), in which the late Justice Jackson, speak-
ing for the Court, enunciates the jurisprudence of
our criminal law, stressing its fundamental roots in
moral responsibility, but showing also the reason-
ableness and necessity of the "public welfare of-
fenses" which penalize where there is no moral
culpability.
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fusal to answer was deliberate. The facts
sought were pertinent as a matter of law,
and [the statute] made it appellant's duty to
answer.
3
Accordingly, this solution of our problem
is offered for whatever it is worth: that the
witness committed no objective moral fault
in deliberately refusing to reveal the names
of his friends to the congressional commit-
tee investigating the Communist Party, but
that he is morally obliged to accept the pen-
alty for his refusal to do so. The civil law
deals in an external forum for the common
good. In the pursuit of its purpose and in
the nature of its forum, it cannot avoid the
hardships which many cases impose upon
individuals.
In view of the emotional temper of the
times, and lest there be too much misunder-
standing, it might be the part of prudence
for the writer to state in conclusion that he
has never been accused of being a com-
munist, or a communist sympathizer, or a
communist dupe. 9 Atheistic communism
is the most viciously false doctrine corrupt-
ing the minds of men. The communist con-
spiracy is the most diabolically organized
evil threatening the civilized world. We
would be dullards to ignore its falsity, and
fools to neglect its threat. The virtues of
both religion and patriotism demand that
we fight communism with every legitimate
weapon at hand. But neither religion nor
patriotism affords us the Weapon of hating
people, not even communists, and much
less ex-communists. Neither religion nor
patriotism persuades us that the end justi-
38 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299
(1929) (emphasis added).
39 Except, I must confess, in some anonymous and
abusive, though highly amusing letters from crack-
pot racial segregationists, I reserve the right to
enjoy, and not to count, anonymous letters.
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fies the means. Neither God nor country
will be well served if, tragically and ironic-
ally, we embrace the basic policy of com-
munism in order to fight it.
In repudiating the communistic end-jus-
tifies-the-means policy, and in shaping our
own anti-communist policy, the United
States Supreme Court plays a vital part. The
Court vindicates the authority of the legis-
lature to investigate all matters within legis-
lative power, the authority of investigating
committees to inquire into all matters within
their delegated power, and by all questions
relevant to the delegated scope of inquiry.
On the other hand, the Court protects the
individual from investigations beyond legis-
lative authority, from investigating commit-
tees acting beyond delegated authority, and
from questions irrelevant to the delegated
scope of inquiry. The decisions concerning
the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment make fascinating reading for
the student of law and of morals. Despite
our arguments and disagreements - and the
billingsgate which disfigures the contempo-
rary civic scene - these decisions constitute
proud proof of the integrity, the intelli-
gence, the industry, and the independence
of the United States Supreme Court. And
they illustrate strikingly the tremendous
task of the law in its constant attempt to
adjust the delicate balance between author-
ity and liberty, between order and freedom,
between public and private welfare, be-
tween the demands of society for the com-
mon good and the demands of the individual
for the dignity and privacy of human per-
sonality.
